virtually unanimous condemnation, while the post Gulf War effort to investigate and dismantle Iraqs program for developing weapons of mass destruction proved politically controversial and has disintegrated in practice.
In the case of the Former Soviet Union, monitoring and managing the threat of nuclear proliferation involves legal and political institution-building, long term economic development support, and technical cooperation projects. None of these efforts are likely to garner a high public profile, but their success is essential to avoid a worst case outcome that might achieve such a profile. This would be the attaining of nuclear weapons capability by a revolutionary rogue state (not India and Pakistan) or non state group with an agenda and a willingness to use that capability.
A second nuclear scenario -local human and environmental disaster associated with the decay and collapse of facilities for the storage of nuclear warheads and nuclear waste also could occur, but even if it is avoided the decay and fragmentation of infrastructure (physical, legal and administrative) can offer avenues for proliferation.
In cither case the key for success is prior preventive action, not measures taken after the facL Without the grim international headlines however -without a crisis or imminent disaster the sustained political, financial and legal attention needed to put programs in place and especially then to sustain them over time is hard to generate or to justify in the face of competing demands. This is the unfortunate reality of dealing with the topic of nuclear proliferation. The threat posed by proliferation is none the less real for being incremental and potential rather than dramatic and immediatdy obvious. In some senses it may resemble the threat of global warming and ecological change, or that posed by uncontrolled population growth. As with these ongoing global problems, the warning signs of future implications exist but can be relcgated to the background in favour of more immediate crises new wars, major Ooods and natural disasters, or droughts and famines.
The analysis offered here considers the threat, or the potential threat, of nuclear proliferation in the states of the Former Soviet Union. Wc examine this subject set against the legal and political framework of the Nonproliferation Treaty and the broader nonproliferation regime. One argument being advanced İs that the while certainly valuable, the Treaty by İtself is inadequate to deal with the multiple potential sources of proliferation. These may be separated into three main categories: direct government policy; indirect neglect of controlling infrastructure; and deliberate illicit acts by individuals, criminal organisations and terrorist groups. Around the Treaty several additional bilateral and international nonproliferation initiatives have bcen undertaken, the effectiveness of which appears to be uneven. The possible transfer of nuc1ear weapons, weapons-grade nuclear materials, technologyand knowledge from Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan continues to pose a real challenge 10 international security, and one that will require constant and consistent attention. Otherwise, a crisis that will involve nuclear materials or even worse, nuc1ear weapons, awaits the international community. This is not, however, simply a study in doom and gloom. We look systematically at the three forms of possiblc nuc1ear proliferation noted above, and examine what political and legal/institutional or other responses have been adopted. Such an analysis allows us the opportunity to weigh realistically the relative importance of potential proliferation sources and threats; and hence, to judge the practical effectiveness of present and ongoing activities intended to manage such sources and threats. Finally, wc suggest what issues we stilI need to consider, and what actions stili need to be taken, iiı the hope of preventing what we believe is an undesi rable outcome further and possi bly widespread nuclcar proliferation.
The Nonproliferation Treaty and the Nonproliferation Regime
Nuc1ear proliferation refers LO both the unauthorised diversion of nuclear arms from existing nuclear states and the increase in the number of nuclear states resulting from political fragmentation and the creation of new states. 2 Proliferation inc1udes more than just warheads; it encompasses a wide range of
2L. S. Wolosky et aL., 'START, START II, and Ownership o[ Nuclear Weapons:
The Case [or a "Primary" Successor State ', Harvard International Law Journal, VoL. 34, 1993, p. 581 [nı. materials and associated technology such as weapons-grade uranium, plutonium, nuclear processing technology, ballistic missile technology, nuclear experts and some dua! use chemicals. 3 Fissile materials are a critical component in the development of nuclear weapons and nuclear capabilities, and thus are included in the list of forms of potentia! nuclear proliferation. 4 In addition, proliferation can occur along two general axes, horizontal and verticaL. Horizonta! proliferation refers to the spreading of nuclear capabilities to states which previously did not have possess them, while vertical proliferation is considered to be the qualitative improvement, or quantitative increase, in nuclear weapons by the recognised existing nuclear weapons states. 5
Development and Strueture of the NPT Regime
The Nonproliferation Treaty6 (NPT) cam e into force in 1970 and is recognised widely as the cornerstone of the nonproliferation regime. The Treaty emerged from a series of United Nations debates and involved compromises between Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) and Non-Nuclear Weapons States (NNWS). Most govemments taking part in the discussions agreed that an international legal framework was an essential component of efforts to control and eliminate nuclear proliferation. However, the motives behind their support for these efforts varied among the govemments that did or did not possess nuclear weapons.
In the 1950s and 1960s the fıve major victorious post-war powers -Britain, China, France, the Soviet Union and the United States all had or were developing nuclear capabilities. They saw a nonproliferation agreement as a means to maintain their advantage by reducing the possibility of smaller states legitimately or otherwise obtaining nuclear capabilities and the political leverage that this provided.7 The governments of the non-nuclear states, on the other hand, generally disliked what they argued was the discriminatory nature of the proposals for the treaty, namely that the NWS would not allow the NNWS to obtain nuclear weapons. These governments, therefore, sought to have several principles and legal mechanisms included in the treaty to control both vertical and horizontal proliferation, and to have the NWS formally commit to the elimination of their own nuclear arsenals. 8 The main obligations of the treaty thus came to revolve around a bargain. Nuclear weapons states accepted obligations not to transfer nuclear weapons or controlover them to anyone and not to assist any nonnuclear weapons states to manufacture or otherwise acquire them, while non-nuclear states have the converse obligation. 9 As well, the nuclcar weapons states made a commitment to pursue the goal of eventual complete nuclear disarmamenl.
The Nonproliferation Treaty is the overarching international legal instrument used to discourage proliferation; in addition, the wider nonproliferation regime is composed of several regional, bilateral, and unilateral nuclear agreements. These include the Nuclear Suppliers Group, a group of nuclear supplier countries which seeks to contribute to the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons 10 and the International Atomic Energy Ageney, which is the monitoring and compliance mechanism in the NPf. A third arrangement is the Missile Technology Control Regime, which limits exports of ballistic missilcs, their parts, or production 7 A. Kapur, 'World and Regional Power Relations without the NPT' in G.
Hastedt facili ties 11. In addition to these international institutions, the nonproliferation regime is expressed through regional nuclear free zones such as the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone; and by the enactment of national nuclear export regulatory policies. 12
Arguably, the nonproliferation regime and the treaty have created a widely accepted international political nonn, and an international legal obligation, of nuclear nonproliferation. 13 The legal structure of the NPT is a refiection of the compromises reached during the extended draft treaty negotiations. it includes safeguards for non-nuclear states such as a five year review process; 14 a three month notice requirement for any signatory state that seeks to withdraw from the treaty; 15 and a number of disarmament provisions for the nuclear weapons states. 16 [VOL. XXiX maintained facilities, and its experienced but poorly (if at all) paid personnel, that is critical to the fate of the nonproliferation regime. A gradual change in approach was detectable even during the final years of the Soviet Union, and has been increasingly apparent in more recent Russian policy. Historically, the USSR was opposed to horizontal nuclear proliferation, whether within the Soviet bloc, to officially non-aligned states or to governments hostile to the Soviet Union.22 Slowly and relatively quietly, however, nuclear export decisions became matters of monetary benefit as mu ch as issues of national security policy. During the latter 1980s, it is now believed, the government of the Soviet Union under President Gorbachev began to solicit potential sales of nuclear technology to (then) officially non-nuclear states such as Argentina, India, Israel, Pakistan and South Korea.
Russia, FSU States and Nonprolijeration
The extent and the success of these initiatives are not known in detaH, and thus it is not clear that the USSR either materially or in fact violated the terms of the Nonproliferation Treaty. Nonetheless these Soviet initiatives implied that even long time supporters of nonproliferation were, for the right price, prepared to sell nuclear equipment, technologyand services to potential proliferators.23 As the economic woes of the Soviet Union built up, and especially in the context of its search for hard currency, concealed government sales of nuclear weapons, technologyand materials were see n to offer a potentially lucrative source of revenue. The financial and political difficulties facing the Russian government under Boris Yeltsin have been equally severe, if not more so; the incentiye and the temptation to pursuc new nuclear deals for hard currency similarly has been considerable.
Preventing Proliferation: Sources, Forms and Responses
A failure to provide adequate economic and social opportunities to its citizens was a major contributing element in the decline and eventual collapse of the credibility of the communist 22Potter, The p. 11. 23Ibid .• p. 12. regime of the Soviet Union. 24 The new Russian government led by Boris Yeltsin inherited many of the economic woes of its Communist predecessors as well as the new problem s bcing created by efforts at achieving a rapid transition to a market economy.25 in these diffıcult circumstances, the nuclear sector has faced three broad challenges regarding proliferation, the fırst being the possibility of deliberate government efforts to raise much needed hard currency through new international sales of systems, facilities and technological capabilities. The second challenge is indirect proliferation resulting from government inatlention, competing fiscal priorities, and the slow but steady decay of management and infrastructure systems. The last, though by no means the !east, challenge is the systematic or opportunistic efforts of the powerful Russian Mafia or other criminal and terrorist groups secking to gain access to nuclear weapons, facilities and technology -either to selI for profit or else for possible use themselves.
Deliberate Government Trans/ers
Deliberate government agreements and nuclear export policies in the Former Soviet Union are the most obvious amongst the variety of challenges facing the NPT regime. Despite formal agreements and treaty obligations, unpredictable changes in policy are possible by governments in Russia or the other FSU states facing a wide variety of pressing domestic social and economic problems. [VOL. XXIX Algeria have been reporıed. 26 In addition, Russian federal spending decisions have sent contradictory messages with respect to nonproliferation issues. On the one hand, in 1998 it was noted that President Boris Yeltsin and Prime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin were quite willing to pass decrees regarding security upgrades for specific nuc1ear facilities and to accept foreign financial assistance for such programs. Yet, at the same time the Kremlin approved funding for the increased production of plutonium instead of the improvement of basic physical and legal infrastructure and security for poorly maintained nuclear plants. it rcmains unclear exactly how many of these proposed saIcs have bcen compIcted. NonethcIess, the existence of such initiatives creates obvious concem regarding the intentions of the Russian and other governments towards upholding their agreements on nonproliferation.
Even if these reported sal es do not directly violate NPT obligations, they do certainly infringe on related aspects of the nonproliferation regime. Specifically, if Russia or Ukraine exports nuclear materials to states which do not have appropriate safeguards in place, theyare in violation of thcir obligations under the Nuclear Suppliers Group32 as well as the International Atomic Energy Agency33 and may be subject to penaltics. In contrast, Belarus and Kazakhstan theoretically are able to export nuclear matcrials absent any sart of formal treaty violation so long as theyare not yet members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. It is understandable in these circumstances why international pressure exists for the NSG to extend its membership to these states, since then at least compliance with -and if necessary enforccment of -the nonproliferation regime would be a elearer and more feasible objective. 34 For over two decades the core international initiative to prevent deliberate nuclear transfers has been the Nonproliferation Treaty. In 1995 the mandated review conference of the NPT decided to extend the treaty for an indefinite period beyond its normal five-year span, although review conferences would continue.35 Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine all were members of the NPT by this time and supported the indefinite extension of the treaty.36 The terms of the extension included: measures to improve the review process; an agreement to sign the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty by 1996;37 the establishment of new nuclear free zones; as well as goals for improving inspection and safeguard regimes and reducing global arsenals. 38 The NPT also has provided the political and legal framework within which the governments that inherited Soviet nuclear weapons could negotiate terms for the transfer of these weapons to Russia, without appearing simply to be acceding to Russian demands. 39 Despite these contributions by the Treaty, fırm commitments by these states governments to eliminate the production of new fıssile materials and further efforts to reduce nuclear weapons were not achieved by the reviewand extension conference before it closed. 40 The regulation and reduction of fıssile matcrials remain matters still largely beyond the seope of the NPT, a disappointing outcome since this area poses some of the most difficult proliferation challenges in the region.
In addition to the terms of the Nonproliferation Treaty, several international accords deal with matters related to the control of nuclear proliferation. Perhaps the most widely known of the se is the nuclear disarmament negotiation that has been discussed under the auspices of the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks. The START began in early 1991 as a bilateral US-Soviet initiative. The START I program was not approved until after the dissolution of the USSR; the re fo re the Lisbon Protocol was introduced in May 1992 to identify Russia. Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine as the successor states to the START treaty, and the refore commit them to eliminate nuclear weapons from their territory.41 START I was ratifıed by each of the se countries, and by the United States, by February 1994 although the treaty did not enter into force until Ukraine acceded to the Nonproliferation Treaty which it did in December 1994. 42 ST ART II originally was intended to advance the START I objectives and create additional nonproliferation and disarmament obligations for the newly independent states. The three main elements of this treaty are: clarification of provisions related to Russian strategic nuclear forces modernisation; Russias commitment to the Anti-BalHstic Missile Treaty43 and conditions regarding US withdrawal from the ABM treaty; and finaIly, a bilateral agreement for deeper reductions in the American and Russian strategic nuclear arsenals. 44 While the treaty passed in the U.S. Senate by a vote of 87 to 4, START II has yet to be ratified by any of the post-Soviet states. After NATO s intervention in Kosovo, and with its continuing domestic cconomic crisis as well as its more recent involvement in military operations against Chechnya, ratification by the communist-dominated Russian Duma (Parliament) has become even more problematic. 45 Still, thcre is some hope that continued westem financial assistance may encourage observance of the terms of the treaty by Russia even without fo rm al ratification. 46 This precedent was established through START I, when reduction terms were introduced in practice before the agreement had formaııy passed through Russian legislation. 47 The Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Missile Technology Control Regime are narrower accords dealing with particular aspects of the nuclear proliferation threat. The MTCR set s out regulations designed to control the spread of sophisticated missile technology to non nuclear weapons states that are attempting to obtain or devclop delivery systcms (that is, missiles).48 The NSG was estabHshcd in the 1980s to help harmonise nuclear export laws and policies among the nuclear weapons states. According to lhe Groups terms of agreemenı, nuclear malcrials are lo be sold only 57 Together. these added complications could cause negotiations to break down. or programs to be cancelled or given lower priority. As a result. opportunities to reinforce the nonproliferation regime are lost.
Nuclear Management and Infrastructure: Decay and Neglect
Other than deliberate government transfers, a second challenge to compliance with the nonproliferation regime in the post-Soviet states is an indirect one: it is a consequence of the absenee of asound legal and political infrastructure in the FSU. In partieular, it stems from the laek of efficient accounting, safety and control meehanisms for nuclear facilities and nuclear weapons grade materials and the absenee of any reliable government body to monitor and enforce these mechanisms. Combined with the brain drain from the nuclear scientific seetor, the se problems raise the risk of proliferation through negleel.
The political commitment to meet international standards and to impose the necessary safeguards, upgrades, export policy control s and accounting systems for nuclear facilities exists, at least on paper, in each of the four post-Soviet states being eonsidered here. 58 Russia and Belarus are further ahead in meeting international standards, while Ukraine and Kazakhstan lag behind in the development of adequate policies. However, the reality of the situation is that all of these states governments currently lack the legal and political infrastructure, as well as the financial means, to implement the requirements of the NPT regime even should they desire to do so.
The laek of asound legal and regulatory infrastrueture especially is detrimental to the enforeement of adequate export control policies as required by several treaties and organisations within the NPT regime, such as the International Atomie Energy Ageney safeguard requirements. Other than through Moseow, the states of the Former Soviet Union did not have a eomprehensive and eoherent system of export eontrols. Thus after the collapse of eommunism, these states were left with the remnants of the eentralised Soviet administrative and legal strueture, and no independent political bodies with the experience and expertise to implement, or even to formuIate, nuclear export laws.59 Sinee then some attempts have heen made to introduee eoherent sets of export For example, in Ukraine and Kazakhstan government bodies have been created to consider this subject, yet there still is no formal legal structure in place to regulate and enforce export laws.
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In all of the post-Soviet states, new export policies have bcen established through a series of ad-hoc and occasionally even contradictory decrees, as opposed to being developed by systematic parliamentary legislation. These decrees do not encompass an entire area of lawand do not have the same force as legislation. The decrees are subject to change without notice, based on the political vagaries of the day, and government bodies are left without clear guidelines setting out their tasks and priorities to implement the existing nuclear export laws.
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The broad economic and political transition to privatisation in the se countries has made this issue more rather than less problematic, as it has reduced state control. In some instances, the administration of export regulations has been placed instead into the hands of corporations which are anxious to establish international trade and which may be unaware of their legal responsibilities as exporters -due at lcast in part to the frequently changing decrees. 63 FinalIy, even if formal legal oversight or directian was to be established through legislation and this remains only a distant prospect these states do not possess the properIy trained personncı needed to implement and enforce such legislation. Both adequate training and necessary funding alike are lacking to give physical 60It is worth noting that Russia has developed a relatively sophisticated export control system in comparison to the other states of the former Soviet Union. While Belarus stiıı lags bchind in this area, its attempts at export policyare much more notable than its post- force 10 monitor and support any such export regulations. it is clear that an efficient and effectiye legal system and structure for export control, there fo re, continues to be some distance away from being a realistic goal.
A second layer of infrastructure weakness beneath this legal and regulatory context is an inadequate accounting system and nuclear safety system throughout the FSU. These types of safeguards virtually did not exist in the Soviet Union, and consequently all of the newly independent states are far behind international standards and expectations.64
An accounting system for nuc\car grade matcrials, able to monitor and track all existing stocks accurately, is critical to ensuring that nonproliferation goals are met; however, this remains a difficult objective to attain. The exact number of weapons and related nuc1ear resources in the whole of the Former Soviet Union stilI is unknown to wc stern states, and quite probably is unknown even to Russian officials. Moscow in particular has been reluctant to disc10se even as much as they do possess of a detai1ed current accounting of thcir nucIear arsenal, since they remain suspicious of western again especially US -motives in obtaining such sensitiye military data. 65 Apart from such reluctance to reveal previously secret information, there simply are no experts in the FSU countries who are versed suffıciently well in the techniques of nuc1ear accounting. Thus to meet NPT requirements, all govemment specialists in this area require the appropriate training which must be arranged and paid for by the West. Even Kazakhstan, which previously had a national system of accounting, is no further ahead since their system is emirely different from international standards.66
The Chernobyl incident startled many governments into realising the importance and urgency of implementing nuclear safeguards and legal regulations in the FSU.67 Belarus, however, is the only FSU govemment that has, on their own initiative, implemented new control s over safety at military facilities as weıı as the safety of nuclear weapons during exereise, relocations and withdrawaı. 68 Ukraine, in which state the ill-fated Chemobyl facility is situated, and Kazakhstan do not exereise any safety measures over their nuclear faeilities except for those which have been developed through westem assistance. 69
A third infrastructure issue which is proving very difficult to manage and which poses potentiaııy significant proliferation concems is the nuclear brain drain. The FSU has experienced a steady exodus of its researchers and other technology experts as they seek or are offered finaneiaııy attractive positions elsewhere, including in rogue states such as Iraq or North Korea. According to the North Atlantic Assembly the basic problem is that in the nuclear weapons field alone between i0,000 and 15,000 experts have access to classifıed infonnation and 2000 to 3000 hold vital secrets'?O The movement of aıı of the se experts is impossible to track, let alone regulate, while incentives for them to remain in the FSU are very few so long as their payand living conditions continue to be poor and indeed deteriorating.
International Responses
The international and bilateral rcsponses to these infrastructure problems have been more muted and certainly less widely considered than the responses to potential state sponsored proliferation. However, the inereasing concem over nuclear safety issues has resulted in several recent multilateral and bilateral efforts aimed at improved training, and assistance in building an adequate legal and regulatory framework in the FSU. Bilateral agreements aııow close monitoring and country specific goals to be achicved, The International Atomie Energy Ageney has supported developing new infrastmeture programs sinee the eollapse of the Soviet Union. This regulatory body provides assistance and advice with respeet to nuelear reaetor safety meehanisms, and nuclear safety issues more generaııy.n Outside of the IAEA, the most notable multilateral efforts have becn established by the G-7. These efforts include the Nuclear Safety Fund (NSF) and the Chernobyl Shelter Implementation Project, both of which are administered by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 73
The Nuclear Safety Fund was created in 1992 with the purpose of improving safety measures in nuclear reaetor plants. In some cases upgrades and the reconstruction of ageing nuclear plants and equipment, and better safety regulations, were to be implemented; in other cases the dismantling and dosure of ineffident and unsafe reactors was necessary,74 The Chernobyl Shelter Implementation Project began in December 1997 to transform the existing Chernobyl sarcophagus into a safe and environmentally stable system'75 The European Bank administers the funds, contracts and regulations for this program.
In addition to these programs, two further infrastmcture projects have bcen supported by the European Union and the G-24. The European Union ereated the Technical Assistanee to the CIS, International Scienee and Technology Centres in Kiev and Moseow, and a eredit line opcn to Russia and Ukraine among other states. All of the se European initiatives have sought to promote an improved and more stable bureaucratic, economic and legal infrastructure through the provision of on-site assistancc, training, 71 Ibid., p. 18. 72lbid.
73European
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Nuclear Safeıy, available at <http://www.ebrd.com/english/opera/nucsafe/main.htm>. 74EBRD, Nuclear Safeıy, p. 1. 75lbid., p. 4. safety studies and some equipment.7 6 The Technology Centres focus specifically on supporting training and employment opportunities for nuclear scientists and experts, to help aııeviate the causes of the technological brain drain out of the FSU.71
The G-24 Working Group on Nuclear Safety includes states and international organisations such as the European Bank, the World Bank, and the IAEA. The Group collects funds from all its members, while individual organisations are allocated different tasks. For example, the IAEA advises the governments of the FSU states and the donor states on technical aspccts of nuclear safety, while the European Union acts as the coordinator for all the involved organisations. 78
Bilateral state initiatives and aid programs often target specific infrastructure tasks such as training, organisational restructuring, management in accounting, nuclear safety, and experts.7 9 Here again, the US funded Nunn-Lugar initiative has been of some value in assisting the relatively new governments of the FSU in their efforts to achieve nonproliferation goals. Law, Vol. 35, 1995, pp. 895-896. 811bid, p. 923. The Nunn-Lugar agreement has umbrella agreements in each of the four post-Soviet States. These in turn include implementing agreements with specific legal regimes eommon to all states, namely, specific These multilateral and bilateral efforts have been the target at times of harsh criticisms conceming their management as well as their motivcs. Primarily, the accusations directed at these groups are that the funds promised are never receivcd, or else are received but not then put to use. A large percentage of the funds is alleged to be divertcd into the hands (or pockets) of individuals, whether in the Russian Mafia or in corrupt government or business cireles. AIso, rather than achieving progress on developing useful new nuelear management infrastructure, these international bodies are accused of simply or cynically creating new business opportunities for western companies out of the problem s in the FSU. A common response of western business investors, however, is that thcse companies as well as the international organisations require a formal, and working, legal and regulatory framework prior to helping lo build a nuclcar safety infrastructure.
Thus, the accomplishment of more readily visible signs of progress can com e onlyarter the development of this less obvious (since less concrete) regulatory framcwork. The critics, it is said, are looking for the wrong signs of achievement.
Criminal and Terrorist Threats of Proliferation
NUelear proliferation through enminal and terrorist activities is an inercasing threat to the NPT regime. This rclativcly new challenge differs substantially from proliferation by state sponsored initiatives or as a result of an inadequate political and legal infrastructure, a1though in some cases it may be associated with the breakdown of the old Soviet military and politieal system. eriminal related proliferation is more difficult to define, let alone identify and counter, since it OCCUfS through many different and usually clandestine channels. obscure identity of these actors, it is difficult to find an appropriate treaty rcmedy or inter-state agrcement that can deal effectively with criminal sponsored nuclear proliferation.
The current political, economic and legal situation in the FSU is volatile and therefore is particularly inviting to criminal activity, including in nuclear materials and nuclear policy. The lack of an adequate infrastructure, safeguards, laws, and political will, combined with uncertainty even regarding the exact number of weapons, leaves nuclear crime hard to anticipate, to monitor, or to prevent. 82
The majority of the cases (and alleged cases) of illegal transfers of nuclcar materials identified thus far have bcen reported rather than systematically documented and dealt with legally. The few documented cases, and westem scientific analyses of the discovered materials, do point to the FSU as the main source of nuclear materials. 83
In addition, there are a large number of smuggling incidents which involve Low Enriched Uranium and dual-use materials, which do not directly violate the Nonproliferation Treaty since theyare not weapons grade matcrials by the definition given in the treaty. These 'diversions, [however,] may be indicative of the ease with which large quantities of sensitive matcrials can be stolen and exported'84
The reported cases that deal with significant amounts of nuclear grade materials share some traits regarding actors, trade routes and discovery of materials. 85 For the most part, the proliferators were employees of a nuclear facility, with access (easily accessible or forecd access) to nuclear grade materials. Often there was no specific buyer yet arranged at the end of the transaction. The matcrials were found cither by accident in the FSU 
International Responses
Combating eriminal nuelear proliferation has been a formidable task for the international eommunity. Several bilateral efforts have been geared towards this task. including elements of the previously highlighted Nunn-Lugar program. In the United States, the CIA and the FBI also have both beeome involved under the US National Seeurity Act. Thus far, this exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction has not been challenged by other states and interested parties. 92 As noted earlier in the case of Russian businesses. Washington also has implcmented unilateral sanctions against companies and rogue states believed or proven to be involved in activities prohibited by the nonproliferation regime.
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Signifieant problems still remain, however. for efforts to eoordinate international responses to the danger of eriminal nuclear proliferation. Most of the international efforts to combat eriminal proliferation have not been endorsed in any international treaty or as a reeognised international norm, even though a 1996 International Court of Justice advisory opinion recognised nuclcar weapons proliferation as an international erime in armed confiiet and humanitarian law. 94 So me of the legal diseussions preceding the 1995 NPT review eonference suggested that international punishment and universal jurisdiction be included in the revisions to the treaty. and that these be broadened to include criminals and employees of this government body were arrested for taking bribes and for issuing licences to export sırategic raw material. eve n migratory nuclear experts who violated the NPT regime.95 Another suggestion was that such crimes be treated as international terrorism, which thus would fall under the scope and mandate of the Geneva Conventions. 96 As yet, however, the sc suggestions have not been incorporated in any formal measures intended to ensure compliance with the nonproliferation regime.
Against this generally dismal background, the G-8 and the United Nations have undertaken some potentially useful initiatives. The G-8 has developed an information-sharing program to help combat nuclear smuggling. 97 They also have introduced a draft treaty dealing with nuclear terrorism, which would extend prosecution to any natural person'f who] manufactures, posscsses, transfers or acquires such a device with the intent to detonate it.98 The United Nations has used the IAEA to attempt to monitor the development of nuclear arsenals and facilities in Iraq, and the Security Council has recognised nuclear proliferators as a threat to international security.99 To what degree the often-divided Security Council will be ablc or willing to use its authority or its power political, economic or military to enforce the NPT regime remains to be seen. The example of Iraq gives a mixed signal at best, as Council membcrs have been deeply divided over UN policies and actions against the Iraqi regime. At lcast, the precedent now exists as an option for attempting to deter potential proliferators. 100
Problems, Prospects and No Easy Solutions
The varietyand the complexity of the challenges facing sUPPorters of nonproliferation when looking at the Former Soviet Union offer little cause for comfort. The task of managing, curbing and hopefuUy preventing nuclear proliferation is made still harder by the broader context of political, economic, social, and legal change and turmoil in Russia and the former Soviet republics of Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan. In may cases, the causes or reasons behind potential proliferation
He not in traditional military security policies or ambitions but in this general uncertainty resulting from the coUapse of empire. Still, it is necessary to find po licies and programs that will be able to address the threat of nuclear proliferation whether the latter arises in the form of deliberate state choices, through neglect and decay of infrastructure, or py criminal or terrorist activity.
The analysis of the possible forms and sources of proliferation, and of responses to these sources, does offer some conclusions and suggestions worth highlighting. First, it is apparent that formal treaties and institutional memberships are helpful measures for managing state policy choices. Reports and accusations of breaches of their commitments under the NPT, MTCR and/or NSG agreements have been levelled at each of the four former Soviet states governments, and it is clear that breaches have occurred of the spirit, if not also the letter, of these agreements. StilI, even Russia despite the Dumas hostility towards the West in the face of NATO enlargement and the recent campaign against President Milosevics ethnic cleansing in Kosovo has been careful to avoid open defiance of NPT prohibitions.
The threat of punishment for breaching the terms of these accords, however, needs to be ba1anced by the provision of rewards, incentives, and compromises to encourage these governments to accept and abi de by the spirit of the nonproliferation regime. The Nunn-Lugar program was renewed by Russia and the United States in June 1999, with President Clinton requesting US$2.8 billion in funding from Congress for the next seven years of the scheme (through to 2006).101 The Nunn-Lugar initiative contains elements dealing with alı three of the forms of proliferation reviewed here giving the Russian government support in decommissioning weapons systems; in maintaining and safeguarding facilities; and in employing otherwise poorly paid nuclear technicians and scientists. What is needed in the first place to make such initiatives more successful aside from more money, since while a large sum the $2.8 billion requested for the Nunn-Lugar program is relatively Httle when divided across seven years and between four states is the enhancement of trust on all sides. The development of a national ballistic missile defence system by the United States (a son of SOL) inevitably wiIl exacerbate the suspicions of American motives in the Russian Duma and mi1itary, whatever concessions Russian President Yeltsin is able to cIaim to have received. Further NATO enlargement, once Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic have been more fully integrated, likewise would have a significant negative effect on pro-western reform voices in Russia and Belarus, and even in the less anti-western governments of Ukraine and Kazakhstan. While American national missilc defence and NATO enlargement may have quite reasonable and modest motives, it is worth giying very serious consideration to their possible indirect consequences since such policies do not occur in an international political vacuum. For example, a missile defence program the ostensible goal of which is to reduce threats of ballistic missile attack against the United States by rogue states and terrorist groups instead may raise the profile of such threats by undermining the nonproliferation regime in the Former Soviet Union. NATO enlargement, especially any second round of such enlargement, combined with that organisalions reluctance to alter its Cold War era nuclear strategy (that of not declaring a No First Use policy regarding nuclear weapons) likely would drive Russia towards redeployment of nuclear weapons into any former Soviet republic that could be persuaded to accept them. Belarus already is believed to be discussing such cooperation with Moscow. 1 0 2
Instead of promoting such security measures, western states might be bctter advised to take a wider view of security, more akin to the mutual security conception promoted in the mid-i980s by then-Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. NATO enlargement should be limited to its present i9-member level; instead, NATOs Partnership for Peace program offers some level of security integration to other eastern and central European states secking links to the west, and avoids unnecessary provocation of anti- Westem elements in Russia. The 1997 compromise reached between Clinton and Yeltsin on theater nuclear defence systems might save the critical Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty, but a better solution could be closer cooperation with Russia and perhaps the other three former nuclear states in developing missile defence technology research projects. This would be seen in Moscow as less of a challenge to Russian security, and it also could be designed as part of the effort to strengthen nuclear management and control systems throughout the Former Soviet Union. As well, it would employ many of the unemployed or unpaid scientists and technidans who otherwise could be tempted away into the service of other states or groups. Like the 1997 compromise package, of course, there would be strong opposition from hardline Republicans in the American Congress, particularly Senator Jesse Helms. Still, the existence of the Nunn-Lugar funding suggests that the re is some room for movement of similar measures through Congress. Russias mi1itary intervention against Chechnya could be another obstac1e to negotiating such cooperation, but high level talks on nuclear cooperation could give Westem criticism of the Chechen campaign more eredence in Moscow.
What does appear to be ele ar from the analysis is that state sponsored nuclear proliferation, although an important concem, may be le ss of a threat to the nonproliferation regime than decay and disintegration of management, control and safeguard infrastructure. The worse that this decay becomes, the greater the chances of nuclear mishap (or local and regional disaster) and the more likely or easy for criminal proliferation to oecur. Political agreements can be negotiated to minimise the incentives of govemments to skirt the boundaries of their treaty commitments, and to maximise their incentives to abide by such terms in spirit and in strict letter. Rebuilding bureaucratic, economic, technical, legal and other management infrastructure for all nuclear related facilities throughout Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus is a daunting task that will soak up funds, time, and personneI. It will require financial, technical, mi1itary and professional educational cooperation over at 1east a decade. So far, nothing on this scale is on the political agenda, only smaller packages of assistance which Russian officials note fall well bcIow the required levels for long term success.
Fonnal international treaties are high profıle events, while infrastructure building and related programs garner less attention, are incremental in progress, and are far harder to showand seıı to a ncws-hungry media or public. In the end, however and assuming that relations between East and West, Russia and the FSU and America and NA TO states do not for any reason turn sour it will be at this lower profıle level that the nonproliferation regime will be maintained and expanded, or undennined.
